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Abstract— This paper considers the problem of secure coding
design for a type II wiretap channel, where the main channel is
noiseless and the eavesdropper channel is a general binary-input
symmetric-output memoryless channel. The proposed secure
error-correcting code has a nested code structure. Two secure
nested coding schemes are studied for a type II Gaussian
wiretap channel. The nesting is based on cosets of a good code
sequence for the first scheme and on cosets of the dual of a
good code sequence for the second scheme. In each case, the
corresponding achievable rate-equivocation pair is derived based
on the threshold behavior of good code sequences. The two secure
coding schemes together establish an achievable rate-equivocation
region, which almost covers the secrecy capacity-equivocation
region in this case study. The proposed secure coding scheme
is extended to a type II binary symmetric wiretap channel. A
new achievable perfect secrecy rate, which improves upon the
previously reported result by Thangaraj et al., is derived for this
channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fostered by the rapid proliferation of wireless communi-
cation devices, technologies, and applications, the need for
reliable and secure data communication over wireless networks
is more important than ever before. Due to its broadcast
nature, wireless communication is particularly susceptible to
eavesdropping. Security and privacy systems have become
critical for wireless providers and enterprise networks. The
aim of this paper is to study practical secure coding schemes
for wireless communication systems.
eavesdropper 
channel
main channel
eavesdropper
legitimate 
receiver
transmitter
X Y
Z
(W)
Fig. 1. Wiretap channel model
Shannon provided the first truly scientific treatment of
secrecy in [1], where a secret key is considered to protect
confidential messages. The ingenuity of his remarkable work
lies not only in the method used therein but also in the
incisive formulation that Shannon made of the secrecy prob-
lem based on information-theoretic concepts. Later, Wyner
proposed an alternative approach to secure communication
schemes in his seminal paper [2], where he introduced the
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so-called wiretap channel model. As shown in Fig. 1, the
confidential communication via a discrete, memoryless main
channel is eavesdropped upon by a wiretapper, who has access
to the degraded channel output. Wyner demonstrated that
secure communication is possible without sharing a secret key
and determined the secrecy capacity for a wiretap channel.
Construction of explicit and practical secure encoders and
decoders whose performance is as good as promised by Wyner
is still an unsolved problem in the general case, except for the
binary erasure wiretap channel [3]–[5].
We note that channel coding and secrecy coding are closely
related. Roughly speaking, the goal of channel coding is to
send a message with sufficient redundancy so that it can be
understood by the receiver; whereas the goal of secrecy coding
is to provide sufficient randomness so that the message can
not be understood by anyone else. In modern communica-
tion networks, error-correcting codes have traditionally been
designed to ensure communication reliability. Various coding
techniques have been thoroughly developed and tested for
ensuring reliability of virtually all current single-user, point-to-
point physical channels. However, only very limited work has
considered ways of using error-correcting codes to also ensure
security. In [3], Ozarow and Wyner considered error-correcting
code design for a type II binary erasure wiretap channel based
on a coset coding scheme. More recently, low-density parity-
check (LDPC) based coding design has been studied for binary
erasure wiretap channels in [4], where the authors have also
presented code constructions for a type II binary symmetric
wiretap channel based on error-detection codes. In another
line of recent related work, secret key agreement protocols
based on powerful LDPC codes have been studied by several
authors [6]–[8]. Designing practical secure coding schemes for
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) wiretap channels, for
example, is still an open problem.
In this work, we focus on secure coding schemes for a
type II wiretap channel, where the main channel is noiseless
and the eavesdropper channel is a binary-input symmetric-
output memoryless (BISOM) channel. We first review and
summarize the prior results of [2]–[4]. Inspired by [9], we
propose a more general secure nested code structure. Next,
we consider a type II AWGN wiretap channel and describe
two secure coding schemes, both of which have a nested
structure. The nesting is based on cosets of a good code
sequence for the first scheme and on cosets of the dual of
a good code sequence for the second scheme. In each case,
we derive the corresponding achievable rate-equivocation pair
based on the threshold behavior of good code sequences
[10], [11]. By combining the two secure coding schemes,
we establish an achievable rate-equivocation region, which
almost covers the secrecy capacity-equivocation region for the
described case study. Finally, we extend the secure coding to
a type II binary symmetric wiretap channel and derive a new
achievable (perfect) secrecy rate, which improves upon the
result previously reported in [4].
II. PRELIMINARIES
We review here some definitions and results from [2]–[4]
and propose a secure nested coding structure, which serves as
preliminary material for the rest of the paper.
A. General Wiretap Channel Model
We consider the classic wiretap channel [2] illustrated in
Fig. 1, where the transmitter sends a confidential message to
a legitimate receiver via the main channel in the presence of
an eavesdropper, who listens to the message through its own
channel. Both the main and the eavesdropper channels are
discrete memoryless, and in particular, the eavesdropper chan-
nel is a degraded version of the main channel. A confidential
message w ∈ W is mapped into a channel input sequence
x = [x1, x2, . . . , xn] of length n, where W = {1, . . . ,M} and
M is the number of distinct confidential messages that may
be transmitted. The outputs from the main channel and the
eavesdropper channel are y and z, respectively. The level of
ignorance of the eavesdropper with respect to the confidential
message is measured by the equivocation H(W |Z). A rate-
equivocation pair (R,Re) is achievable if there exists a rate
R code sequence with the average probability of error Pe → 0
as the code length n goes to infinity and with the equivocation
rate Re satisfying
Re ≤ lim
n→∞
H(W |Z)/n.
Perfect secrecy requires that, for any ǫ0 > 0 there exists a
sufficiently large n so that the normalized equivocation satisfies
H(W |Z)/n ≥ H(W )/n− ǫ0.
Hence, perfect secrecy happens when Re = R, i.e., all the
information transmitted over the main channel is secret. The
capacity-equivocation region of the wiretap channel X →
(Y, Z) [2] contains rate-equivocation pairs (R,Re) that satisfy
Re ≤ R ≤ max
p(x)
I(X ;Y )
0 ≤ Re ≤ max
p(x)
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)]. (1)
B. Wyner Codes and Secrecy Bins
It is instructive to review first the problem of unstruc-
tured secure code design in terms of the stochastic encoding
scheme introduced by Wyner [2]. As demonstrated in [2]
the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel is achieved by
using a stochastic encoder, where a mother codebook C0(n)
of length n is randomly partitioned into “secret bins” or sub-
codes {C1(n), C2(n), . . . , CM (n)}. A message w is associ-
ated with a sub-code Cw(n) and the transmitted codeword
is randomly selected within the sub-code. Such codebook
allows for decomposing the twofold objective of achieving
both reliability and secrecy into two separate objectives. The
mother code C0(n) provides enough redundancy so that the
legitimate receiver can decode the message reliably, whereas
each sub-code is sufficiently large and, hence, introduces
enough randomness so that the eavesdropper’s uncertainty
about the transmitted message can be guaranteed.
Even though [2] does not describe a structured coding
scheme, it does suggest that encoding for reliability and
confidentiality would be to partition the mother code into
sub-codes. This idea has been extended to structured or semi-
structured codes by using coset codes in [3], [4].
C. Secure Nested Codes
In the following, we construct secure error-correcting codes
with the nested code structure [9].1
We consider a nested linear code pair (C0(n), C1(n)), where
C0(n) is a fine code of rate R0, and C1(n) a coarse code of
rate R1. We use the fine code C0(n) as the mother code, which
is partitioned into M sub-codes consisting of the coarse code
C1(n) and its cosets. Each coset corresponds to a confidential
message. The transmitter encodes a message w ∈ W into
an n-tuple of coded symbols randomly selected within the
corresponding coset Cw(n). By determining the coset of the
transmitted codeword, the legitimate receiver can retrieve the
confidential message w. The redundancies provided by each
coset are used to confuse the eavesdropper who has full
knowledge about the code and its cosets. We refer to a code
structured in this manner as a secure nested code. We note
that the code C1(n) and its cosets have the same (Hamming)
distance properties. Hence, the secure coding design problem
is to find a suitable nested code pair (C0(n), C1(n)) that sat-
isfies both confidentiality and reliability requirements. Denote
by {C(n)} a sequence of binary linear codes, where C(n) is
an (n, kn) code having a common rate Rc = kn/n. Now, we
define the secure nested code sequence as follows.
Definition 1 (secure code sequence): {C0(n), C1(n)} is a
secure nested code sequence if C0(n) is a (mother) fine code
of rate R0, and C1(n) is a coarse code of rate R1 so that
C1(n) ⊆ C0(n) and R1 ≤ R0. The information rate of this
code sequence is R0 −R1.
D. Good Code and Its Noise Threshold
Following MacKay [10], we say that a code sequence
{C(n)} is good if it achieves arbitrarily small word (bit) error
probability when transmitted over a noisy channel at a nonzero
rate Rc. Capacity-achieving codes are good codes whose rate
Rc is equal to the channel capacity. The class of good codes
includes, for example, turbo, LDPC, and repeat-accumulate
1In this paper, we consider binary-input wiretap channels and nested linear
codes. This idea can be extended to nested lattice codes for channels with
continuous inputs.
codes, whose performance is characterized by a threshold
behavior in a single channel model [11].
Definition 2 (noise threshold): For a (single) channel
model described by a single parameter, the noise threshold of
a code sequence {C(n)} is defined as the worst case channel
parameter value at which the word (bit) error probability
decays to zero as the codeword length n increases.
For example, the noise threshold is described in terms of the
erasure rate threshold δ⋆ for a binary erasure channel (BEC)
and the SNR threshold λ⋆ for a binary-input AWGN (BI-
AWGN) channel. Noise thresholds associated with good codes
and the corresponding maximum-likelihood (ML), “typical
pair”, and iterative decoding algorithms have been studied in
[12]–[14].
E. Type II Wiretap Channel
The type II wiretap channel was introduced by Ozarow and
Wyner in [3] as a special binary-input wiretap channel with
a noiseless main channel. Throughout the paper, we focus on
type II wiretap channels associated with different eavesdropper
channels.
Example 1 (BEC-WT): Let BEC-WT(ǫ) denote a binary-
input wiretap channel where the main channel is noiseless
and the eavesdropper channel is a BEC with erasure rate ǫ.
We refer to such a channel as the type II binary erasure wiretap
channel. The secrecy capacity of BEC-WT(ǫ), Cs,BEC(ǫ),
equals ǫ.
Let {C⊥(n)} be a sequence of dual codes, where
C⊥(n) = {x ∈ {0, 1}n |x · y = 0, ∀ y ∈ C(n)}
is the dual code of C(n). By employing the dual code as the
coarse code in the secure nested code structure, we reorganize
the results of [3], [4] in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Consider a sequence of binary linear codes
{C(n)} of rate Rc and erasure rate threshold δ⋆ ≤ 1 − Rc
(for the BEC). Let
C0(n) = {0, 1}n and C1(n) = C⊥(n). (2)
Suppose that the secure nested code sequence {C0(n), C1(n)}
is transmitted over a BEC-WT(ǫ). Then, if
ǫ ≥ 1− δ⋆, (3)
the achievable rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) = (Rc, Rc).
Lemma 1 illustrates that one can design practical secure codes
to achieve perfect secrecy with a certain transmission rate
(below the secrecy capacity) for a BEC-WT. The condition
(3) implies that to achieve the secrecy capacity, the coding
scheme requires a capacity-achieving code sequence as the
dual code of the coarse code.
Two capacity-achieving LDPC code sequences for BECs
have been described in [15], called the Tornado sequence
{CT(n)} and the right-regular sequence {CR(n)}. For both of
these sequences, the erasure rate threshold δ⋆ = 1−Rc = ǫ.
Corollary 1: Consider LDPC code sequences {CT(n)} and
{CR(n)} of rate Rc. Let C0(n) = {0, 1}n and
C1(n) = C⊥T (n) or C1(n) = C⊥R (n). (4)
Then, the secure nested code sequence {C0(n), C1(n)}
achieves the secrecy capacity of BEC-WT(1−Rc).
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we consider practical coding design for
secure communication over a type II AWGN wiretap channel.
As shown in Fig. 2, the eavesdropper channel is a BI-AWGN
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Fig. 2. Type II AWGN wiretap channel
channel characterized by transition probabilities
g(z|X = 1) = 1√
2π
exp
[
−(z +
√
2λ)2
2
]
and g(z|X = −1) = 1√
2π
exp
[
−(z −
√
2λ)2
2
]
(5)
where λ = Es/N0 is the ratio of the energy per coded symbol
to the one-sided spectral noise density, which is referred to as
the SNR of the eavesdropper channel. We denote this chan-
nel with AWGN-WT(λ). The capacity-equivocation region of
AWGN-WT(λ) contains rate-equivocation pairs (R,Re) that
satisfy
Re ≤ R ≤ 1
0 ≤ Re ≤ 1− CBI−AWGN(λ) (6)
where
CBI−AWGN(λ) = 1−
1√
π
∫ +∞
−∞
e−(y−
√
λ)2 log2
(
1 + e−4y
√
λ
)
dy (7)
is the channel capacity of BI-AWGN channel with SNR λ.
In the following, we consider two approaches to designing
secure codes, both of which have a nested structure. In each
case, we derive the corresponding achievable rate-equivocation
pair based on the threshold behavior of good codes [11].
We note that even for a general BI-AWGN channel (without
a secrecy constraint), designing practical capacity-achieving
codes is still an open problem. Hence, to allow secure codes
to be implementable, we either loosen the perfect secrecy
requirement (allow for a nonzero gap between the transmission
rate and the equivalent rate) or reduce the transmission rate
compared with the capacity. In the first approach, we construct
practical codes ensuring an equivocation rate that is below the
transmission rate; whereas, in the second approach, we design
secure codes to achieve perfect secrecy with a transmission
rate that is below the secrecy capacity. We summarize code
designs and the corresponding achievable rate-equivocation
pair as follows.
A. Approach I: Good Coarse Code
In Approach I, we use a good code as the coarse code C1(n).
Theorem 1: Consider a sequence of secure nested codes
{C0(n), C1(n)}, where C0(n) = {0, 1}n and {C1(n)} is
a good binary linear code sequence of rate R1 and SNR
threshold λ⋆ (for BI-AWGN channels). Suppose that the
secure nested code sequence {C0(n), C1(n)} is transmitted
over AWGN-WT(λ). Then, if λ ≥ λ⋆, the rate-equivocation
pair
(R,Re) =
(
1−R1, 1− CBI−AWGN(λ)
) (8)
is achievable.
Theorem 1 is proved in Appendix A. Note that if the code
sequence C1(n) is not a capacity-achieving sequence, then
R1 < CBI−AWGN(λ⋆) ≤ CBI−AWGN(λ).
The gap between the rate R1 and the capacity CBI−AWGN(λ⋆)
implies Re ≤ R. Hence this approach cannot achieve perfect
secrecy when using non capacity-achieving sequences.
Example 2: Consider a sequence of (4, 6) regular LDPC
codes {CLDPC(n)} [16]. Let
C0(n) = {0, 1}n and C1(n) = CLDPC(n).
The design rate of CLDPC(n) is R1 = 1/3. The SNR threshold
of {CLDPC(n)} satisfies λ⋆ ≤ 0.302 under typical pair
decoding [14] (and hence, under ML decoding). Assume that
the secure code {C0(n), C1(n)} is transmitted over AWGN-
WT(λ = 0.302). The achievable rate-equivocation pair is given
by
(R,Re) =
(
1−R1, 1− CBI−AWGN(0.302)
)
= (2/3, 0.663).
In this case, the gap between the transmission rate and the
equivalent rate is less then 0.004.
Moreover, Approach I can be extended to the general AWGN
wiretap channel (the main channel is also a BI-AWGN chan-
nel) by constructing a nested LDPC code pair.
B. Approach II: Dual Good Code as Coarse Code
In Approach II, we use the dual code of a good code as the
coarse code C1(n). Let
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
1√
2π
exp
(
−z
2
2
)
dz. (9)
Theorem 2: Consider a sequence of good binary linear
codes {C(n)} of rate Rc and erasure rate threshold δ⋆ (for
BECs). Let
C0(n) = {0, 1}n and C1(n) = C⊥(n). (10)
Suppose that the secure nested code sequence {C0(n), C1(n)}
is transmitted over an AWGN-WT(λ). Then, if
Q(
√
2λ) ≥ (1− δ⋆)/2, (11)
the rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) = (Rc, Rc) is achievable.
We provide the proof in Appendix B. Theorem 2 illustrates
that Re = R if the eavesdropper channel SNR λ satisfies the
condition (11). Hence we can achieve perfect secrecy without
using capacity-achieving codes.
Example 3: We use a sequence of (4, 6) regular LDPC
codes {CLDPC(n)} of rate Rc = 1/3 as in Example 2. Let
C0(n) = {0, 1}n and C1(n) = C⊥LDPC(n).
The erasure rate threshold of {CLDPC(n)} is lower-bounded
as δ⋆ ≥ 0.665 under typical pair decoding [17] (and hence,
under ML decoding). Assume that the secure code sequence
{C0(n), C1(n)} is transmitted over AWGN-WT(λ ≥ 0.465).
Since
2Q(
√
2λ) ≥ 0.335 ≥ 1− δ⋆,
Theorem 2 implies that this code sequence can achieve perfect
secrecy at the transmission rate 1/3.
Corollary 2: Consider LDPC code sequences {CT(n)} and
{CR(n)}. Let C0(n) = {0, 1}n and
C1(n) = C⊥T (n) or C1(n) = C⊥R (n). (12)
Assume that the nested code sequence {C0(n), C1(n)} is
transmitted over AWGN-WT(λ). Then, perfect secrecy can be
achieved at (and below) the transmission rate 2Q(
√
2λ).
Corollary 2 implies that the gap between the secrecy capac-
ity (6) and the achievable (perfect) secrecy rate is
∆ = 1− CBI−AWGN(λ)− 2Q(
√
2λ).
The gap ∆ can be reduced if one can find a tighter sufficient
condition than (11).
C. Achievable Rate-Equivocation Region
Now, we consider the achievable rate-equivocation region
based on practical codes for AWGN-WT(λ). For a given
channel SNR λ, we choose a good code sequence {C(n)} of
rate R⋆ so that its SNR threshold λ⋆ ≤ λ. Let C0(n) = {0, 1}n
and select C1(n) from
{0}n, {0, 1}n, C(n), and C⊥R (n)
corresponding to different equivocation rate requirements. By
using a time-sharing strategy, we can show that the secure
coding scheme achieves the rate-equivocation region
RAWT = convex hull


(0, 0),(
2Q(
√
2λ), 2Q(
√
2λ)
)
,(
1−R1, 1− CBI−AWGN(λ)
)
,(
1, 1− CBI−AWGN(λ)
)
, (1, 0)

 .
Example 4: Consider AWGN-WT(λ = 0.32) and the good
code sequence {C(n)} = {CLDPC(n)} described in Exam-
ple 2, whose SNR threshold is bounded as
λ⋆ ≤ 0.302 < 0.32 = λ.
Fig. 3. depicts the region RAWT and compares it with the
capacity-equivocation region for AWGN-WT(0.32).
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Fig. 3. Achievable rate-equivocation region for AWGN-WT(0.32)
IV. TYPE II BINARY SYMMETRIC WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we study the type II binary symmetric
wiretap channel. This channel was studied previously in [4]
and an achievable secrecy rate based on error-detecting codes
was given. In the following, we apply the coding technique in
Approach II and obtain an improved secrecy rate with respect
to the result in [4].
Let BSC-WT(q) be a type II binary symmetric wiretap
channel, where the eavesdropper channel is a binary symmetric
channel (BSC) with crossover rate q. The secrecy capacity of
BSC-WT(q) Cs,BSC(q) = h(q), where h(q) is a binary entropy
function. We first summarize the result of [4] in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2: Consider a sequence of error-detecting codes
{CD(n)} of rate R1, whose detection error rate is less than
2−nR1 . Let C0(n) = {0, 1}n and C1(n) = CD(n). Assume
that the nested code sequence {C0(n), C1(n)} is transmitted
over a BSC-WT(q). The maximum possible secrecy rate that
can be achieved by this construction is − log2(1 − q).
The authors of [4] have also stated that error-detecting codes
include Hamming codes and double-error-correcting BCH
codes; however, most known classes of error-detecting codes
have R1 = 0. Hence, the implementation of such secure codes
described in Lemma 2 is still an open problem.
Following Approach II, we construct implementable perfect
secrecy nested codes for BSC-WT(q) as follows.
Theorem 3: Consider a sequence of good binary linear
codes {C(n)} of rate Rc and erasure rate threshold δ⋆ (for
BECs). Let C0(n) = {0, 1}n and C1(n) = C⊥(n). Suppose
that the secure nested code sequence {C0(n), C1(n)} is trans-
mitted over an BSC-WT(q). Then, if
q ≥ (1− δ⋆)/2, (13)
the rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) = (Rc, Rc) is achievable.
Proof: The proof is similar to the one described in
Appendix B by constructing an equivalent BSC channel as
in Fig. 4.
1
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1
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Fig. 4. Equivalent BSC channel with crossover probability q
By using the LDPC code sequence {CR(n)}, i.e., setting
C1(n) = C⊥R (n), the achievable (perfect) secrecy rate under
this construction is 2q, which is better than − log2(1 − q)
derived in [4]. We compare the achievable (perfect) secrecy
rate with the secrecy capacity for BSC-WT(q) in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Achievable secrecy rate vs secrecy capacity for BSC-WT(q)
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of secure
coding design for a type II wiretap channel. A secure error-
correcting code has been proposed in terms of a nested code
structure. Two secure nested coding schemes have been studied
for a type II AWGN wiretap and the corresponding achievable
rate-equivocation pair has been derived based on the threshold
behavior of good code sequences. Combining the two secure
coding schemes, we have established an achievable rate-
equivocation region, which almost covers the secrecy capacity-
equivocation region in this case study. Furthermore, we have
also applied the proposed secure coding scheme to a type II
binary symmetric wiretap channel, and have obtained a new
achievable (perfect) secrecy rate, which improves upon the
previous result of [4].
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The reliability at the desired receiver can be ensured since
the main channel is noiseless. Now, we calculate only the
equivocation:
H(W |Z) = H(W,Z)−H(Z)
= H(W,X,Z)−H(X|W,Z)−H(Z)
≥ H(X)−H(X|W,Z)− I(X;Z)
≥ n−H(X|W,Z)− nCBI−AWGN(λ). (14)
In order to calculate the conditional entropyH(X|W,Z), we
consider the following situation. Let us fix W = w and assume
that the transmitter sends a codeword x ∈ Cw(n). Given index
W = w, the eavesdropper decodes the codeword x based
on the received sequence z. Let P (Cw, n) denote the average
probability of error under ML decoding at the eavesdropper
incurred by using coset Cw(n). We note that the code C1(n)
and its coset Cw(n) have the same distance properties, and
hence, have the same SNR threshold under ML decoding.
Based on the threshold behavior of good codes [11] and the
condition λ ≥ λ⋆, we have limn→∞ P (Cw, n) = 0. Moveover,
Fano’s inequality implies that
lim
n→∞
H(X|W,Z)/n ≤ lim
n→∞
[1/n+ P (Cw, n)R1] = 0. (15)
Combining (14) and (15), we have the desired result.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
To develop the achievable rate-equivocation pair, we con-
sider an equivalent channel model illustrated in Fig. 6. We
observe that the equivalent channel embeds a binary erasure
wiretap channel X → (Y, Z ′), where Z ′ is the BEC output
with alphabet {1, 0,−1}. The proof can be outlined as follows.
We first construct a BEC-WT(ǫ) and an associated channel
with transition probabilities fZ|Z′ so that the channel X → Z
is equivalent to the original BI-AWGN with SNR λ. To this
end, we choose the erasure rate ǫ as follows
ǫ =
∫ ∞
−∞
min
[
g(z|X = −1), g(z|X = 1)] dz = 2Q(√2λ).
Let us define transition probabilities fZ|Z′ as
f(z|Z ′ = 1) =
{
g(z|X=1)−g(z|X=−1)
1−ǫ z ≥ 0
0 z < 0
f(z|Z ′ = 0) =
{
g(z|X = −1)/ǫ z ≥ 0
g(z|X = 1)/ǫ z < 0
f(z|Z ′ = −1) =
{
0 z ≥ 0
g(z|X=−1)−g(z|X=1)
1−ǫ z < 0.
(16)
We can easily verify that
∑
z′ p(z
′|x)f(z|z′) = g(z|x). This
implies that the designed concatenated channel is equivalent
to the original AWGN-WT(λ).
Next, we design secure nested codes for the upgraded BEC-
WT(ǫ). Note that the confidential message W , the BEC output
Z ′, and the received signal at the eavesdropper Z satisfy the
Markov chain W → Z ′ → Z . The data processing inequality
[18] implies that the normalized equivocation can be bounded
as
H(W |Z)/n ≥ H(W |Z′)/n.
Finally, we have the desired result by applying Lemma 1.
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